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I. INTRODUCTION
Crime seems to be an inevitable part of the American existence. Few
citizens, if any, remain unaffected by crime. Generally, police departments
have attempted to deter criminal activity by having a regular shift of officers
patrol a neighborhood and respond to radio calls for police assistance.'
However, a new type of criminal has emerged on American streets. Armed
with uzis and AK-47s, gang members and drug dealers are descending upon
formerly "safe" neighborhoods with increasing frequency. From 1985 to 1990
alone, arrests for drug abuse violations rose more than twenty-three percent. 2
Moreover, this figure does not even represent the drug-related offenses
committed in order to buy drugs or to maintain drug/gang territories.3
Unfortunately, traditional crime control methods seem to have little impact on
these problems. 4
I George L. Kelling and David Fogel, Police Patrol-Some Future Directions, in THE
FUTURE OF POLICING 156-60 (Alvin W. Cohn ed., 1978).
2 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS 165 (1985) (702,882 total number of drug abuse violation arrests for 1985);
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 165
(1986) (691,882 total number of drug abuse violation arrests for 1986); FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 165 (1987) (811,078
total number of drug abuse violation arrests for 1987); FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 169 (1988) (850,034 total number of
drug abuse violation arrests for 1988); FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 173 (1989) (1,075,728 total number of drug abuse
violation arrests for 1989); FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 175 (1990) (869,155 total number of drug abuse violation arrests
for 1990).
3 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS 175 (1990). Other drug offenses related to buying drugs include robbery and
burglary. Some assaults and murders can also be included as drug-related offenses related to
maintaining drug territories. In order to maintain drug trafficking boundaries, drug dealers
often must use violence. In addition, gang activity often correlates with drug activity. Gangs
traffic drugs in their area. Thus, gang-related crime often is also drug-related crime. See
generally CALIFORNIA COUNCIL ON CRIM. JUSTICE, STATE TASK FORCE ON GANGS AND
DRUGS xii (1989) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA COUNCIL ON CRIM. JUSTICE].
4 PETER K. MANNING, POLICE WORK: THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF POLICING, 348
(1977); CHARLES P. McDowELL, POLICE IN THE COMMUNITY 112 (1975); JEROME H.
SKOLNICK & DAVID H. BAYLEY, THE NENV BLUE LINE: POLICE INNOVATION IN Six
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Faced with these rising crime statistics, increasing public scrutiny, and the
knowledge that traditional crime control methods largely have proven
unsuccessful against drugs and gang violence, police departments and state
legislatures are proposing numerous ideas to combat these problems, ranging
from increasing penalties for drug and gang-related crimes to publicly whipping
criminals. 5 While many ideas are dismissed as obvious violations of civil
rights, these brainstorms have produced some innovations in policing. Two
noteworthy techniques being implemented in several cities are saturation patrols
and roadblocks. 6 These techniques represent an aggressive approach to crime
control because the goal is to establish a dominant police presence in an area in
order to deter individuals from committing crime.7 With saturation patrols and
roadblocks, police departments attempt to achieve this dominant presence by
placing numerous officers and/or barricades in high-crime areas of the city.8
Then, the officers engage in frequent police-citizen contacts. 9 However, while
deterring criminals from an area, use of saturation patrols and roadblocks also
has the potential to violate individuals' fourth amendment rights.10
This Note examines the possible problems with using aggressive policing
tactics by focusing on programs in three geographic areas: Operation A.C.E. in
Columbus, Ohio; Operation Hammer in Los Angeles, California, as well as the
informational checkpoints in Paramount, a suburb of Los Angeles; and
Operation Clean Sweep in Washington, D.C. Part II of this Note discusses the
theoretical purposes as well as the actual practices of these programs. Part M
Kansas City Preventive Patrol experiment. In this study, the city was subdivided into three
areas. In one area, a regular shift of patrol officers was assigned to patrol the area when not
answering radio calls. In another area, the number of officers was doubled for patrolling the
area when not answering calls. In the final area, preventive patrol was eliminated
altogether, and officers only went into the area to answer calls. Generally, the number of
officers who patrolled an area seemed to have little impact on crime. Although this study
has some implications for using saturation patrols, unlike the programs discussed in this
Note, there was no public announcement that the police were putting more officers in
certain areas of the city. WILSON, supra.
5 Seth Mydans, Powerful Arms of Drug War Arousing Concern for Rigts, N.Y.
TMs, Oct. 16, 1989, at Al.
6 See Columbus City Police Dep't, News Release No. 91-26 (May 29, 1991) (on file
with the author); Los ANGELES POLICE DEP'T, OPERATION GUIDELINES, HAMMER TASK
FORCE (June 7, 1988) [hereinafter L.A. POLICE DEP'T OPERATION GtIDELMES]; Ex. 1 Cr.
No. 86-0331, Galberth v. United States, 590 A.2d 990 (D.C. App. 1991) (Exhibit 1 is a
section of the Washington, D.C. Police Department's manual for Operation Clean Sweep).
7 Ex. 1 Cr. No. 86-0331, Galberth, 590 A.2d at 990.
8 1d.
9 Id.
10 See Glass v. Columbus, No. C2-91-775 (S.D. Ohio, filed Sept. 20, 1991); Galberth,
590 A.2d at 995.
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reviews the legal background for street encounters and roadblocks. Part IV
analyzes the constitutional implications of these programs, specifically
examining the constitutional questions which remain unanswered by the
Supreme Court in relation to such programs. Finally, Part V explores the
future for police innovation and suggests possible alternatives to long-term use
of saturation patrols and roadblocks.
II. BACKGROUND ON POLICE INNOVATION IN COLUMBUS, OHIO; Los
ANGELES, CALIFORNIA; AND WASHINGTON, D.C.
A. Operation A. C.E.
"[W]e're going to take the neighborhood back."11 This sentiment captures
the essence of the Columbus City Police Department's new program, Operation
A.C.E. (Active Criminal Eviction). Announced in a news release on May 29,
1991, the stated purpose of Operation A.C.E. is "[t]o reduce street crime from
groups loitering to sell drugs or commit prostitution." 12 Unlike other
specialized divisions of the police force which focus on high-level suppliers of
drugs, A.C.E. is aimed at ridding neighborhoods of users and low-level
sellers. 13 By focusing on street-level groups, officials hope to make
neighborhoods safe again for residents to engage in "normal" community
life. 14
To accomplish this goal, the A.C.E. program originally was to employ
four techniques. First, in a neighborhood identified by the police department as
a high-crime area, officers would enlist community support by working with
civic groups in the area. Officers would explain other elements of the program
to the groups and also gain information about local crime activity from these
organizations.' 5 In neighborhoods without a civic group, crime prevention
officers would go door-to-door to explain the program to area residents. 16
Second, the police department planned to do some selective traffic enforcement,
more popularly known as roadblocks. 17 Under this technique, all vehicles using
11 Steve Stephens, Scaled-down Sweep Hits North Side Last Night, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, June 5, 1991, at B4 (quoting Commander Richard Morgan of the Columbus
Police Department).
12 Columbus City Police Dep't, supra note 6.
13 Stephens, supra note 11.
14 Id.
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a particular roadway would be briefly detained so officers could check drivers'
licenses and registrations.18 In this way, officials hoped to cut off illicit sellers
from their buyers. 19 However, this portion of the A.C.E. program has not been
implemented because of concerns arising from Galberth v. United States,20 the
case which found Operation Clean Sweep's roadblocks unconstitutional. 21
Third, saturation patrols, more popularly known as sweeps, would be
introduced into specified neighborhoods. 22 With saturation patrols, numerous
foot patrol officers descend on a neighborhood and ask passersby for
identification, ask them what they are doing in the neighborhood, and run
warrant checks on suspicious persons.23 Finally, after initial saturation patrols
were brought into an area and the area was deemed secure, the department
would discontinue the patrols.24 Additionally, to keep the area "crime free,"
the department would work with other city offices such as those for street
lighting and sanitation.25
The most controversial aspect of Operation A.C.E. has been the saturation
patrols. Once a neighborhood has been targeted for an A.C.E. offensive,
officers infiltrate the neighborhood and question individuals on the street. If the
citizen complies with the questioning, officers fill out field identifier cards. 26
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 590 A.2d 990 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
21 Felix Hoover, Roadblocks in Short North on Hold, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 4,
1991, at Cl.
22 Columbus City Police Dep't, supra note 6.
23 Glass v. Columbus, No. C2-91-775 (S.D. Ohio, filed Sept. 20, 1991). Although this
suit by the ACLU was dropped, the facts alleged serve as a good basis for understanding
how Operation A.C.E. is being implemented as well as possible concerns raised by this
program. The ACLU described police-citizen contact in this manner:
[A] citizen is approached by several foot patrolmen. The citizen is required to state
his name, produce some identification, and explain his presence in the area. The citizen
is not free to leave until after the police have called over the radio for a computer check
to determine whether the citizen has an outstanding arrest warrant.
Id. at 9.
24 Columbus City Police Dep't, supra note 6.
25 ld.
26 Leslie Pereira, Ace Winning Folks' Hearts, COLUMBUS DISPATH, July 14, 1991, at
B1. The Columbus City Police Department contends that these field identifier cards were
filled out only on persons engaging in suspicious activities. Cards were not filled out for
individuals who complied with questioning. Letter from Commander D. James Dean, the
Columbus Police Dep't, to the author (June 3, 1992) (on file with the author).
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These cards list information such as name, age, and physical description. 27
Upon completion, the card is sent to the narcotics bureau or the crime analysis
unit to check possible connections to local crimes. 28 If the individual objects to
the questioning, the individual is told that "... . the area is one of high crime
and if the person is there seeking drugs or prostitution, an arrest is likely, if not
certain." 29 The police department contends, however, that the individual is
then free to leave.30
Vigorous enforcement of all criminal and traffic laws, including minor
misdemeanors, is a key tactic of the saturation patrols. 31 This strict
enforcement often acts as a means for stopping individuals in order to check for
outstanding warrants or to search for drugs and weapons.32 Jaywalking, in
particular, appears to be a common offense for which individuals are stopped.33
Once an individual is stopped, warrant checks can take up to thirty minutes.34
The major concern with the saturation patrols is that officers are subjecting
individuals to "Terry-type" stops35 without reasonable suspicion to stop
them. 36 In response to this concern, the Columbus City Police Department
drafted a manual discussing relevant Supreme Court cases.37 Before officers
can be assigned to the Operation A.C.E. unit, they must receive a passing
score of 70% or better on a test of these cases.38
27 Letter from Commander D. James Dean, the Columbus Police Dep't, to the author
(June 3, 1992) (on file with the author).
28 Id.
2 9 ACE is Played, Ctizens Back Police Clean Sweeps, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 15,
1991, at A6.
30 Id. There are conflicting views on whether individuals are free to leave at this point.
The ACLU contends that individuals are forced to stay until a warrant check is completed.
However, the Columbus Police Department maintains that individuals are free to go if they
indicate that they do not want to answer questions.
31 Columbus City Police Dep't, supra note 6.
32 Steve Stephens, Police Begin Second Sweep, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 20, 1991,
at Cl.
33 Glass v. Columbus, No. C2-91-775, 10-13 (S.D. Ohio, filed Sept. 20, 1991); Pat
Schmucki, Rights Violated Under Martial Law, COLUMBUS ALVn, July 10-24, 1991, at 5.
34 Glass, No. C2-91-775 at 10-13.
35 A "Terry-type stop" is based on Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), in which the
Supreme Court determined that an officer can detain an individual for a limited time if he
has reasonable suspicion that the individual has committed or is about to commit a crime.
36 Teny, 392 U.S. at 1.
37 CoLuMBus CITY POLICE DEP'T, TRAINING MANuAL FOR INVESTIGATORY STOPS
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B. Operation Hammer and the Paramount Checkpoints
In the last decade, Los Angeles literally has become a war zone, a city
beseiged by gang violence and crime. In 1989, the California Council on
Criminal Justice issued a report estimating that there are approximately 250
gangs in Los Angeles with a membership in excess of 30,000. 39 The Council
further reported that in 1987 there were 387 gang-related homicides in the
greater Los Angeles area. 40 To deal with this devastating situation, several
programs have been introduced by the Los Angeles Police Department and
sheriffs' departments in neighboring suburbs. Two such programs are
Operation Hammer, implemented by the Los Angeles Police Department, and
the Paramount checkpoints, implemented by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department.
Operation Hammer, as the name suggests, is an aggressive attack on gang
problems. Operation Hammer began in 1988 as a task force aimed at curbing
gang activity. 41 The purpose of the task force is two-fold: To improve
community relations by emphasizing quality of service, and to rid Los Angeles
streets of violent gang criminals. 42 Essentially, the police department wants to
make life as miserable as possible for gang members while at the same time
creating a highly visible police force for the rest of the community. 43
As part of the program, each bureau of the police department acts as a
separate component of the task force.44 Within each bureau, a Field
Commander is selected to organize activities for that bureau. 45 In particular,
Field Commanders are responsible for disseminating the following information
to other officers: 1) specific locations where gang activity is prevalent; 2)
boundaries of specific gang territories; 3) identities of known gang members; 4)
methods of identifying particular gangs; 5) identities of associate and rival
gangs; and 6) other relevant information which would improve enforcement
activities. 46 With this information, officers (usually in large numbers) go to
39 CALIFORNIA CouNcIL ON CRIM. JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 7.
40 Id.
41 L.A. POLICE DEP'T OPERATION GUIDELINES, supra note 6.
42 Id.; see also Letter from It. Hugh Halford, Los Angeles Police Dep't, to the author
(July 29, 1992) (on file with the author).
43 Sandy Banks, The Legacy of a Slaying; Westvood Gang Stooting Alters Public
Attitudes, Police Tactics, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1989, at 82.
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known gang locations and attempt to arrest gang members for anything they
can,47 from selling drugs to failing to pay parking fines.48
As in Los Angeles, the city of Paramount, a suburb of Los Angeles, has
experienced problems with gang violence. In July, 1991, Paramount was
affected by twenty-two gang-related shootings. 49 To combat this problem,
Paramount tried a radically new idea in law enforcement. In August, 1991,
Paramount began implementing checkpoints (roadblocks) to curb gang
activity.50 In order to comply with the California Attorney General's guidelines
on roadblocks, 51 before a checkpoint is established, times and location of the
checkpoints are first announced in the local media. Then, a warning sign is
posted ahead of the checkpoint so that drivers can take an alternate route.52 The
sheriff's department employs a numerical formula for stopping cars at the
checkpoint. 53 For example, every fourth car may be stopped. Officers then
pass out pamphlets to the drivers who are stopped, seeking information about
gang activity and suggestions on how to stop such activity. 54
Officials contend that the purpose of these checkpoints is not to find
individuals to arrest (however, blatant violators such as drunk drivers will be
arrested). Instead, the sheriff's department wants to send a message to gang
members that their activities will no longer be tolerated in the community. 55
Two concerns arise from these programs. First, critics urge that Operation
Hammer serves as a way for police officers to harass all youths, especially
males. 56 In their view, probable cause for crimes is non-existent. Instead,
47 Celeste Fremon, G-Dog and the Home Boys, When Guns are Blazing and the Bullets
Fly, the Gangsters of Pico-Aliso Turn to Father Gregory Boyle, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 11, 1991,
Magazine at Al.
48 George Stein, LAPD Nails 352 in Operation Hammer, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 21, 1989,
atB1.
49 Janet Rae-Dupree, Cars Stopped at Infornational Gang Checkpoint in Paramount,
L.A. TIm.s, Aug. 17, 1991, atB1.
50 Id.
51 Letter from Robert D. Robinson, Dir. of Public Safety for the City of Paramount, to
the author (June 12, 1992) (on file with the author). Mr. Robinson indicates that these
checkpoints strictly adhere to the Attorney General's guidelines.
52 Rick Holguin, Roadblocks to Curb Gangs to be Set Up in Paramount, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 9, 1991, at Al.
53 Id.
54 Id.; Rae-Dupree, supra note 49.
55 Rae-Dupree, supra note 49.
56 See Fremon, supra note 47; Sylvester Monroe, Complaints About a Crackdown;
Minorities Carge That the Los Angeles Police Department's War on Gangs has Become a
War on Their Commnunities, TIm, July 16, 1990, at 20.
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youths are considered "guilty until proven innocent." 57 Second, critics are
concerned about the privacy intrusion of the Paramount checkpoints. 58 Carol
Sobel, an attorney with the ACLU, suggests that if the sheriff's department is
only looking for information, then "they should go door to door and drop (the
pamphlets) in [the] mail." 59
C. Operation Clean Sweep
If police officials of Operation A.C.E., Operation Hammer, and the
Paramount checkpoints think that they have legal troubles, they should be
thankful that they are not in charge of Operation Clean Sweep. Controversy
appears to be the signature card of this program.
Established in August, 1986, the purpose of Operation Clean Sweep was to
curb open-market drug transactions as well as violence associated with drugs in
Washington, D.C. 60 This purpose was to be achieved by employing
roadblocks, saturation patrols (jump-out squads), and street-level buy/bust
tactics. 61 Uniform saturation patrols made officers highly visible to individuals
in the area and officers were encouraged to use frequent contacts as a way to
make the area as unpleasant as possible for narcotics dealers. 62 Like saturation
patrols, roadblocks were implemented to disrupt narcotics trafficking patterns
and to discourage potential customers from entering the area.63 When setting
up a roadblock, the Washington, D.C. Police Department emphasized choosing
a site where safety and visibility could be afforded to oncoming motorists. 64 A
systematic method of checking vehicles would be used rather than a random
schedule.65 For example, every third car would be stopped instead of the
officers stopping whomever they felt like stopping. Adequate warnings also had
to be afforded to motorists through signs, flares, or marked vehicles. 66 In
addition to saturation patrols and roadblocks, the Washington, D.C. Police
57 Monroe, supra note 56 (quoting Patricia Erickson, an attorney for the ACLU who
contends that minority teenage males are particularly at risk of police brutality. The issue of
police brutality, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.).
58 Holguin, supra note 52.
59 Id.
60 Linda Wheeler & Sari Horwitz, Operation aean Sweep's Future Uncertain, D.C.
Police Officials Seek to Revamp Drug Program to Cut Cost, WASH. PosT, Jan. 26, 1988, at
Al.
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Department also utilized a reverse buy/bust system in which undercover
officers infiltrated open drug markets by purchasing narcotics. 67
While officials hoped to curb drug markets with Operation Clean Sweep,
the end result, instead, seems to have been conflict and abandonment of the
program. Early in the program, owners of area businesses complained that the
jump-out squad portion of Operation Clean Sweep was "killing business." 68
Moreover, officials had to defend the roadblock portion of Operation Clean
Sweep in two lawsuits. 69 In United States v. McFayden, the Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit found the roadblocks employed in the sixth district of the
city were constitutional because the roadblocks served the legitimate
government interest of responding to traffic problems and checking for drivers'
licenses and registrations. 70 However, in Galberth v. United States,71 the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals found a roadblock on Montello Avenue
and Queen Street unconstitutional. That court determined that using a
roadblock was not an effective way to achieve the city's goals of combatting
violence and illegal drug activity. 72 Therefore, the city's goals did not
outweigh privacy concerns. 73 The court remanded another case consolidated
with Galberth involving a roadblock on 14th and Quincy Streets to the trial
court, so the trial court could make specific findings about the principal
purpose for that roadblock. 74
Overall, the main concern with Operation A.C.E., Operation Hammer,
Operation Clean Sweep, and the Paramount checkpoints is that individuals are
detained and searched without the amount of suspicion required by the United
States Constitution. Supporters of these programs, however, maintain that they
are completely constitutional. Therefore, to grasp the complexities of the legal
issues involved with these programs, it is important to have a basic
understanding of the Supreme Court's treatment of search and seizure
questions.
67 Id.
68 John W. Anderson & Elsa Walsh, Drug Sweeps Spur Debate; Effect on D.C.
Buinesses, Residents' Rights Questioned, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1986, at B1.
69 See United States v. MeFayden, 865 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Galberth v.
United States, 590 A.2d 990 (D.C. App. 1991).70 McFayden, 865 F.2d at 1307.
71 590 A.2d 990 (1991).
7 2 Id. at 998-99.
73 Id. at 999.
74 Id. at 999-1000.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND FOR STREET ENCOUNTERS AND ROADBLOCKS
A. Street Encounters
As previously indicated, saturation patrols usually are implemented to
establish a dominant police presence in the community to deter street-level
criminal activity. 75 To further this purpose, officers in saturation patrols
concentrate on stopping individuals and asking them questions. 76 This police-
citizen interaction may occur in three different contexts: an arrest, a stop, or a
voluntary contact.77 Since the arrest and stop are involuntary detentions of an
individual, the fourth amendment is triggered by these police actions.78
The fourth amendment legitimizes individuals' desire for privacy,
providing constitutional protection against abusive and arbitrary privacy
invasions by the state. 79 However, the fourth amendment does not grant an
absolute ban against privacy intrusions. Instead, individuals only have the right
"to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures . . . . " Because this clause is somewhat ambiguous,
several concepts must be examined to decide what constitutes an "unreasonable
search or seizure."
1. What is a "Search?"
The first element to define is "search." A search is a "governmental
infringement of an individual's privacy." 8' To determine whether an
individual's privacy has been invaded, the Supreme Court has adopted Justice
Harlan's two part test from his concurrence in Katz v. United States.8 2 First,
the individual must have exhibited an actual subjective expectation of privacy.83
Thus, "items exposed to the public, abandoned, or obtained by consent are not
protected because an individual has not maintained a reasonable expectation of
75 See supra text accompanying note 62.
76 Id.
7 7 See generally Richard A. Williamson, 7he Dimensions of Seizure: The Concepts of
"Stop" and "Arrest," 43 OHIo ST. L. 771 (1982).
78 Id. at 802.
79 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
80 Id.
81 21st Annual Review of Ciminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts
of Appeals 1990-1991, 80 GEo. L.J. 939, 941 (1992) [hereinafter 21st Annual Review].
82 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
83 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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privacy in those items." 84 Second, society must be prepared to recognize that
expectation as objectively reasonable.8 5 The Court has held that the street is a
place where individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy.86
2. What is a "Seizure?"
The second ambiguity which needs to be defined is the concept of a
"seizure." Determining what consitutes a seizure has been problematic for the
Supreme Court. One definition posited by the Supreme Court is that a seizure
occurs "whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his
freedom.... "87 Another definition, suggested by Professor Richard
Williamson, is any "significant restriction of movement." 88
Regardless of the precise definition used, the Supreme Court has found that
not all police-citizen contacts are "seizures." 8 9As the Court indicated in Terry
v. Ohio, "Street encounters between citizens and police officers are incredibly
rich in diversity. They range from wholly friendly exchanges of pleasantries or
mutually useful information to hostile confrontations of armed men involving
arrests, or injuries, or loss of life." 90
The Court went on to say in a footnote that "[o]nly when the officer, by
means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the
liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred." 91 Thus, if
an individual voluntarily complies with an officer's request for information,
and the officer does not restrain the individual's freedom, then the individual
has not been seized.
The question thus becomes-when is an individual's freedom restrained?
The footnote in Terry was the Supreme Court's first clue about what might
constitute restraint-physical force or a show of authority. While it may be
easy to decide whether someone has been detained by physical force,
determining whether someone has been involuntarily detained due to a show of
authority is more difficult.
In 1980, the Supreme Court provided another clue for deciding this issue.
In United States v. Mendenhall, the defendant was approached by two plain
84 21st Annual Review, supra note 81, at 942.
85 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
86 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
87 Id. at 16.
88 Williamson, supra note 77, at 777.
89 See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544 (1980).
90 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968).
91 Id. at 19 n.16.
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clothes DEA agents who suspected her of narcotics trafficking at the Detroit
Metropolitan Airport. 92 After complying with the officers' request to see her
driver's license and airline tickets, Mendenhall followed the officers to the
airport DEA office. 93 The agents then asked if they could search her purse as
well as her person. During a strip search, two small packages of heroin were
located.94
The decision in this case appears disjointed and confusing because there
was no majority opinion by the Court. Three members of the Court determined
that this encounter constituted a seizure but found that the encounter was
permissible because the officers had reasonable suspicion that the defendant
was engaged in criminal activity. 95 Four justices argued that the encounter
constituted a seizure but found that the officers lacked reasonable grounds to
suspect her of criminal activity.96 However, the most curious opinion was
written by Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist. Although the lower
court had readily determined that this encounter constituted a seizure, Justice
Stewart ignored this finding and first examined whether a seizure had occurred
in this case.97 His test for determining whether an individual is seized within
the meaning of the fourth amendment is whether a reasonable person would
have believed that he was free to leave under the circumstances. 98 If so, then
there is no intrusion upon a person's liberty or privacy interests when an
individual remains to answer questions.99 Applying his test, Justice Stewart
determined that there had not been a seizure because the events took place in
the public concourse, the officers were in plain clothes, they displayed no
weapons, and they did not summon the defendant but merely requested to see
her identification and ticket. 100
However, in a case with facts similar to Mendenhall, the Court found not
only a seizure, but the most invasive of seizures-an arrest.101 Although
Florida v. Royer,102 like Mendenhall, is somewhat disjointed with several
opinions, a majority of the Court accepted Stewart's test for assessing restraint.
Royer, much like Mendenhall, was observed by detectives at the Miami
92 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547 (1980).
93 Id. at 548.
94 Id. at 549.
95 Id. at 560 (Powell, J., concurring).
96 Id. at 571-77 (White, J., dissenting).
97 Id. at 551.
98 Id. at 554.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 555.
101 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
102 Id.
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International Airport where he was suspected of being a drug courier because
he matched the characteristics of a "drug courier profile." 103 The detectives
approached Royer, identified themselves as police officers, and asked to see
Royer's airline ticket and driver's license.104 When the name on the driver's
license did not match the name on the airline ticket, the detectives asked Royer
to accompany them to a room described as a "large storage closet." 10 5 They
did not return his license or airline ticket. 10 6 Royer followed the detectives but
did not orally respond to the detectives' questions. 10 7 In the room, the
detectives asked to search Royer's luggage.108 Royer produced a key but made
no response to their question.109 The search uncovered marijuana. 0
In determining that the encounter was not voluntary, the Court focused on
the fact that the detectives kept Royer's ticket, identification, and luggage as
well as the fact that the detectives made no effort to tell Royer that he did not
have to consent to the search.11 1 The Court also found relevant the fact that
Royer was moved from one location to another." 2 The plurality refused to
characterize the initial encounter in which the detectives asked to see
identification as a seizure. 113 The four dissenters agreed that the initial
encounter did not constitute a seizure.1 14 Only Justice Brennan concluded that a
seizure occurred when the officers identified themselves and asked Royer for
his identification and airline ticket."25
While the Mendenhall-Royer test provides some guidance for determining
whether a particular encounter is a seizure, uncertainty still exists about what
facts should be scrutinized when examining the surrounding circumstances. In
Mendenhall, Justice Stewart suggested that such factors as the threatening
presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some
physical touching of the person, language, and tone of voice should be
examined to decide whether compliance with the officer's request was
compelled."16 Professor Williamson expands several of these points, suggesting
103 Id. at 493.




108 Id. at 494-95.
109 Id. at 494.
110 Id. at 494-95.
111 Id. at 503-04.
112 Id. at 504-05.
113 Id. at 498.
114 Id. at 515 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Id. at 523 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
115 Id. at 511 (Brennan, J., concurring).
116 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980).
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that display of a weapon could include putting a hand on a holstered firearm.1 17
A frisk of a suspect as well as certain verbal commands such as "Stay where
you are!" would also prove compulsion.118 Other relevant factors courts have
examined include the location of an encounter, the method by which an officer
initiates the encounter, the nature of the questions asked, and the request to
move to a different location." 9 All of these factors are reviewed in totality to
determine whether an individual acted voluntarily.
However, the Supreme Court, as well as lower courts, has noted some
dissatisfaction with its Mendenhall-Royer test. Certainly, most reasonable
people will not feel free to leave when questioned by an officer. The mere
psychological makeup of the interaction dictates such a result.120 However, in
two recent opinions, the Supreme Court has indicated that psychological
pressure to cooperate with police officers merely because they are authority
figures in American society is not what the Court means when it says that a
reasonable person would not feel free to leave. 121
In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Delgado,122 the Court found
that responses of workers in a clothing factory to questions by INS agents were
not compelled even though the individuals were at work and INS agents
positioned themselves at the exits of the building. The Court acknowledged the
psychological pressure argument but indicated that "[w]hile most citizens will
respond to a police request, the fact that people do so, and do so without being
told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the
response." 123 In fact, in this decision, the Court seems to make a definite shift
in stance regarding what constitutes a seizure. This shift can best be seen in the
Court's articulation of the Mendenhall-Royer test in which the Court notes that
"[u]nless the circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating as to
demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to
leave if he had not responded, one cannot say that the questioning resulted in a
detention under the Fourth Amendment."' 24 The added language suggests that
the Court is now focusing on whether the individual felt free not to respond
rather than whether the individual felt unable to leave.
117 Williamson, supra note 77, at 793.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 794.
120 Professor Williamson discusses Professor Wayne LaFave's argument that any time
a police officer approaches an individual, a show of authority is implicit. Id. at 781.
121 Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
122 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
123 Id. at 216.
124 Id. (emphasis added).
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This concept was substantiated in Florida v. Bostick 25 when the Court
further narrowed the Mendenhall-Royer test. In Florida v. Bostick, police
officers boarded a bus occupied by the defendant, questioned the defendant and
other passengers, and requested permission to search defendant's luggage. 126
While this case certainly fell within the "a reasonable person would not have
felt free to leave" category because most individuals would not feel free to
leave a departing bus which contains their luggage, the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of this search.127 The Court changed the Mendenhall-Royer
test somewhat, noting that "the appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonable
person would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate
the encounter." 128 Moreover, the Court emphasized that the reasonable person
being contemplated is a reasonable person, innocent of any crime.129
With these two opinions, the Court seems to have made two significant
changes. First, independent factors such as being at work or on a departing bus
will not be considered when deciding whether a reasonable person would feel
that he could not leave. Instead, the perceived restriction must come from
police conduct. Second, the Court seems to be imposing an affirmative duty on
suspects to refuse to answer an officer's questions first before a seizure will be
found.
3. What is "Unreasonable?"
While the Supreme Court has found that not all police-citizen encounters
constitute seizures, the Court has held that arrests and stops are seizures under
the fourth amendment because these police practices involve restraining an
individual by force or a show of authority. 130 Of course, not all arrests and
stops are fourth amendment violations. The fourth amendment only protects
individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. 131 Thus, the next item to
examine is what the Court considers an unreasonable seizure.
At one time, it was believed that all involuntary police encounters had to
be predicated on probable cause in order to be "reasonable." 132 This notion
125 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
126 Id. at 2384-85.
127 Id. at 2389.
128 Id. at 2387.
129 Id. at 2388.
13 0 Wiliamson, supra note 77, at 802.
131 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
132 Wayne R. LaFave, "Seizures" Typology: lassifng Detenions of the Person to
Resolve Warrant, Grounds, and Search Issues, 17 U. Mca. J.L. REF. 417, 418 (1984).
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largely emerged from the idea that police-citizen contacts were either arrests or
not seizures at all. 133 However, the Supreme Court dispelled this theory in
Terry v. Ohio134 by acknowledging the legitimacy of the police practice of
"stops."
In Terry, Officer McFadden observed three men pacing back and forth
from a street corner to a store window, conferring at the corner upon the
conclusion of each trip. 135 Relying on over thirty years of experience as a
police officer, Officer McFadden suspected the men of "casing the store for a
stickup," so he stopped the individuals to investigate. 136 During a brief
patdown of Terry's outer clothing, he felt a suspicious bulge.137 He then patted
under Terry's coat and recovered a gun from Terry's left breast pocket. 138
The Court decided that, under the fourth amendment, Officer McFadden
had seized Terry. 139 However, the Court chose to "assume" that the seizure
began when Officer McFadden searched Terry for weapons. 140 Although
Officer McFadden did not have probable cause to believe that Terry had
committed a crime, the Court determined that the detention was permissible by
employing a balancing test for analyzing reasonableness. 141 Under this new test
(which later came to be known as "reasonable suspicion"), an officer's actions
would be judged by an objective standard: "[W]ould the facts available to the
officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate?" 142 The Court
further specified that the officer must be able to articulate specific reasons for
his actions; mere inarticulable hunches that an individual seemed suspicious
would not suffice. 143 Applying this test, the Court found that Officer
McFadden's actions withstood constitutional scrutiny because Officer
McFadden was able to give specific reasons why he thought Terry and his
cohorts were about to commit a robbery. 144
133 Id.
134 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
135 Id. at 5-6.
136 Id. at 6-7.
137 Id. at7.
13 8 1d.
139 Id. at 19.
140 Id. at 19 n.16.
141 Id. at 22-24.
142 Id. at 21-22.
143 Id. at 22.
144 Id. at 27-31.
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The Court in Terry also used this new test when it decided that Officer
McFadden's protective search for weapons was constitutional. 145 Finding that
Officer McFadden had reason to suspect that Terry and his accomplices might
be armed and dangerous, the Court decided that a limited patdown for weapons
was reasonable."46 However, the Court specified that this search had to be
limited to the discovery of weapons which might harm the officer or nearby
citizens.' 47 Because Officer McFadden only searched under Terry's coat after
he felt an object which might be a gun, the Court found that the search had
been sufficiently limited to the discovery of weapons.' 48
With its opinion in Terry, the Supreme Court constitutionally recognized
the police "stop" and announced a new standard for judging these contacts. 149
However, Terry was ambiguous on certain points and needed to be clarified by
later decisions. One area of confusion concerned the constitutionality of
pre-search nonarrest detentions. By "assuming" that Terry's seizure began at
the point of the search, the Court ignored the issue concerning the level of
suspicion constitutionally necessary to engage in pre-search detentions. The
Supreme Court answered this question in Adams v. Williams150 when it made
two assumptions. First, the Court assumed that the validity of a weapons search
depended upon the validity of the stop prior to the search. 15 Second, the Court
assumed that pre-search stops predicated on less than probable cause could be
constitutional. 152 Ironically, the Court came to this conclusion by reformulating
Terry. Quoting Terry, the Court emphasized that "a police officer may in
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for
purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no
probable cause to make an arrest." 253
Although the Supreme Court in Terry specifically reserved making a
decision about the constitutionality of pre-search detentions,154 the Adams
Court interpreted this language to mean that pre-search detentions predicated on
less than probable cause are constitutionally permissible.' 55 The Court went on
to approve a reasonable suspicion standard for such detentions when it
45Id.
146 Id. at 30.
147 Id. at26.
148 Id. at 29-30.
149 Id. at 19-20.
150 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
151 Id. at 145.
152 Id. at 146.
153 Id. at 145 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968)).
154 Teny, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
155 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1972).
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announced that "[A] brief stop of a suspicious individual in order to determine
his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more
information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at
the time." 156 Thus, this opinion brought all involuntary non-arrest detentions
under the same standard. Before an officer may involuntarily detain an
individual, even to ask questions, the officer must be able to articulate specific
reasons for "stopping" the individual.
Another unresolved point concerned the type of circumstances which
constitute reasonable suspicion. Although the Court emphasized that
inarticulable hunches were insufficient, it failed to adequately address which
type of facts would fall into the hunch category and which type would fall into
the reasonable suspicion category. The case of Brown v. Texas 157 provides
some assistance in this area. In Brown, the Court determined that officers
lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Brown merely because he was in a high
drug traffic area and the situation in the alley in which he and another
individual were located "looked suspicious." 158 The officers felt that the
situation "looked suspicious" because the two individuals in the alley appeared
to be together but walked away from each other once they saw the officers. 159
The Court emphasized that these facts failed to demonstrate that Brown's
activities were any different from other individuals in the neighborhood.160
Thus, singling out Brown was impermissible.
Essentially, this opinion indicates that officers must point to specific,
objective facts about why a particular individual's actions seem suspicious.
Officers cannot rely solely on facts about the area in which the suspicious
actions are taking place in order to establish reasonable suspicion.
The permissible scope of searches incident to a stop have also been
examined since Terry. The Court in Terry announced that protective searches
for weapons are permissible, but only if the officer reasonably suspects that the
individual is armed and dangerous, and the search is limited to discovering
weapons. 161 This point was driven home in Sibron v. New York when the
Court found an officer's search unconstitutional. 162 In Sibron, the officer
ordered Sibron out of a restaurant and told him: "You know what I am
after."1 63 When Sibron reached into his pocket, the officer also reached into
156 Id. at 146 (emphasis added).
157 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
158 Brown, 443 U.S. at 48, 52.
159 Id. at 48.160 Id. at52.
161 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-26 (1968).
162 Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65 (1968).
163 Id. at 45.
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the pocket and recovered several envelopes containing heroin. The Court
determined for other reasons that the seizure was impermissible, but it also
noted that even if the seizure had been constitutional, the officer's search of
Sibron was impermissible because the search was not reasonably limited in
scope. 16 4 Unlike Officer McFadden in Teny, this officer made no attempt to do
a limited exploratory search for weapons. Instead, he reached into the pocket
where he expected to find narcotics. 165
Finally, questions also have emerged since Teny regarding the permissible
duration of a stop. Like the scope of a search incident to a stop, the length of
time to effectuate a stop must also be reasonable. 166 The Supreme Court has
refused to set a rigid time limit on how long is reasonable;167 however, the
Court noted in United States v. Place that it has never approved a seizure of the
person for as long as ninety minutes. 168 On the other hand, the Court
determined in United States v. Sharpe that twenty minutes is not necessarily too
long for a stop. 169 In assessing whether the duration of the stop was too long in
Sharpe, the Court focused on whether the police "diligently pursued a means of
investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly,
during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant." 170
To summarize, a stop is considered a less intrusive privacy invasion than
an arrest, so stops must only be predicated on "reasonable suspicion." 171 To
meet this standard, an officer must reasonably suspect that the individual is
committing or is about to commit a crime. 172 The reasonableness of the stop
will be judged by an objective standard-the facts available to the officer must
convince a reasonable person that the action was appropriate. 173 The officer
must be able to articulate specific reasons why the individual seemed
suspicious; mere inarticulable hunches will not be deemed sufficient. 174 Once a
stop has been effected, the officer may do a limited protective search for
weapons when there is reason to suspect that the individual is armed and
164 Id. at 65.
165 Id. at 45.
166 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON ThE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 9.2(), at 374 (2d ed. 1987).
167 See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985).
168 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709-10 (1983).
169 Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686-88.
170 Id. at 686.
171 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 22.
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dangerous. 175 However, the scope of this search must be confined to the
discovery of weapons which may be used to assault the officer or nearby
citizens. 176 Finally, stops must be conducted within a reasonable amount of
time. 17 7
The final police-citizen contact which can occur during street encounters is
also the most intrusive: the arrest. To be deemed an arrest, a police-citizen
contact need not be limited to situations in which an officer informs a suspect
that he is "under arrest" and takes the individual to the station house.178
Instead, the Supreme Court focuses on the level of intrusion. 179 Factors which
the Court has examined when assessing whether a contact constitutes an arrest
include the degree of force used or displayed to effectuate the contact,
statements made by the officer, the duration of the contact, and the location of
the contact. 180 Essentially, the Court examines these factors and if the
particular police action goes beyond the limited purposes of a "stop," the Court
finds that the encounter was an arrest.181 Thus, as Professor Williamson aptly
points out, "'[a]rrest'. . . becomes a term of art describing all seizures that
include an intrusion on personal liberty greater than that conferred under the
authority of a stop." 182
For an arrest to be considered a reasonable seizure, the arrest must be
predicated on probable cause. 183 As the Court noted in Henry v. United States,
"probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances known to the officer
warrant a prudent man in believing that an offense has been committed." 184 As
it does in determining reasonable suspicion, the Court uses an objective
standard for assessing probable cause-would a reasonable person believe that
the suspect has committed or is committing a crime?185
The Supreme Court has also approached defining probable cause like
reasonable suspicion in that the Court has employed a variable test.186 In other
words, the Court examines the facts of each case, rather than establishing
narrow legal rules for every situation. As the Supreme Court pointed out in
175 Id. at 24-26.
176 Id. at 25-26.
177 3 LAFAvE, supra note 166, at 374.
178 Williamson, supra note 77, at 804.
179 See generally LaFave, supra note 132; Williamson, supra note 77.180 LaFave, supra note 132; Williamson, supra note 77.
181 LaFave, supra note 132; Williamson, supra note 77.
182 Williamson, supra note 77, at 805.
183 1 LAFAvE, supra note 166, § 3.1(a), at 543.
184 Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959).
185 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
186 1 LAFAvE, supra note 166, § 3.2(a), at 558.
[Vol. 54:497
SATURATION PATROLS & ROADBLOCKS
Illinois v. Gates, "probable cause is a fluid concept-turning on the assessment
of probabilities in particular factual contexts-not readily, or even usefully,
reduced to a neat set of legal rules." 187
However, one of the problems with using a variable test is in determining
what amount of suspicion rises to the level of probable cause. Commentators
agree that probable cause lies somewhere between reasonable suspicion and
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.188 However, the lines between these standards
have become increasingly difficult to discern, especially between reasonable
suspicion and probable cause, because the Supreme Court has seemed to
construe probable cause more leniently in the last decade.189
In any case, once an officer has made a valid custodial arrest (an arrest in
which the officer will be taking the suspect into custody), even if the arrest is
for a minor violation such as driving without a license, 190 the officer may do a
search incident to arrest. 191 Unlike the limitations of the "stop and frisk"
search, an officer may search an arrested individual in order to discover
weapons or evidence. 192 The policy behind allowing officers to search the
individual for evidence is to prevent the individual from concealing or
destroying evidence. 193
However, while officers are granted more latitude in a search incident to
arrest, these searches must be limited to the person and the area within the
immediate control of the person. 194 The Supreme Court has held that search of
an entire premises as a search incident to arrest is impermissible.195 On the
other hand, the Court has found that searching the entire passenger side of an
automobile as a search incident to arrest is permissible. 196
Although a search incident to arrest grants officers broader investigative
powers, it is important to remember that officers can conduct a search incident
to arrest only after they have made a valid custodial arrest. 197 Officers are not
permitted to search incident to arrest based on a pretextual arrest. 198 A
187 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).
188 1 LAFAVE, supra note 166, § 3.2(d), at 586.
189 See generally LaFave, supra note 132; Wdliamson, supra note 77.
190 See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414
U.S. 260 (1973).
191 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).




196 See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
197 See John M. Burkoff, The Pretext Search Doctine: Now You See It, Now You
Don't, 17 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 523, 523 (1984).
198 Id.
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pretextual arrest occurs when the police use an arrest based on probable cause
as a means to investigate or search for evidence for an offense for which they
do not have probable cause. 199 When a search is incident to a pretextual arrest,
the search is unconstitutional. 200
The Supreme Court first articulated that pretextual arrests are
constitutionally impermissible in United States v. Leflkowitz 201 when it
announced that "[a]n arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for
evidence."202 Like other seizure issues, the Court applies an objective test for
determining whether an officer arrested an individual as a pretext for
conducting a search rather than examining the subjective intentions of the
officer. 203 The test then centers on whether an officer's actions were reasonable
in light of the surrounding circumstances. 20 4
B. Roadblocks
Police departments also use roadblocks to establish a dominant police
presence and deter criminal activity. 205 Roadblocks have been employed to
deter various activities: drug trafficking,206 gang violence,207 drunk-driving,20 8
and the importation of illegal aliens.209
Because roadblocks are temporary, involuntary detentions of individuals
driving motor vehicles, roadblocks are seizures. 210 In most situations, police
officers do not have individualized suspicion that the occupants in each car that
they stop are committing a crime.211 However, the Supreme Court has
determined that some types of roadblocks do not require reasonable
suspicion.212 The Court has come to this conclusion by employing a balancing
test for traffic encounters in which the Court weighs: 1) the seriousness of the
199 United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1039 (7th Cir. 1989).
200 Burkoff, supra note 197, at 523.
201 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932).
202 Id.
203 Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978).
204 Id.
205 Ex. 1 Cr. No. 86-0331, Galberth v. United States, 590 A.2d 990 (D.C. App.
1991).
206 Id.
2 07 Holguin, supra note 52.
208 Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
209 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
210 Id. at 556.
211 See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 456 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Mainez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at
545.212 Si, 496 U.S. at 455; Mainez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 556.
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public interest served by the seizure; 2) the degree to which the seizure
advances that public interest; and 3) the severity of the interference with
individual liberty.213
Using such a test, the Supreme Court first articulated in United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte that some roadblocks require less than reasonable suspicion in
order to be considered reasonable under the fourth amendment. 214 The
Martinez-Fuerte case involved a fixed border patrol checkpoint in which all
vehicles on a major highway near the border were briefly detained to determine
whether any illegal aliens were being transported. 215 The Court found that
preventing the illegal importation of aliens was an important state goal. 216 The
Court then focused on the impracticality of requiring reasonable suspicion in
such situations. 217 Not only would a reasonable suspicion requirement for each
car stopped be impractical due to a heavy flow of traffic, but such a
requirement would also eliminate the goal of preventing illegal aliens from
entering the country. 218 Because most stops lasted only a few minutes, the
Court determined that the governmental interest in keeping illegal aliens out of
the country outweighed the minimal intrusion on privacy. 219
However, in contrast, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,220 a border patrol
case decided just one year prior to Martinez-Fuerte, held that officers on roving
patrol must have reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle. As in Martinez-Fuerte,
the Court noted that the government has a significant interest in detecting
illegal aliens. 221 Moreover, the state presented evidence that the length of each
stop was only a few minutes.222 However, for the Court, the significant
difference between these two cases seems to be the fact that roving patrols
allowed "broad and unlimited discretion" on the part of patrol officers. 223
This concern over unlimited officer discretion also seemed to impact the
decision of Delaware v. Prouse.224 In Prouse, an officer randomly stopped the
driver of a car to check his license and registration without any reasonable
213 Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979) (Although Brown involves a street
encounter, the balancing test used in this case has generally been used to judge traffic
encounters also.).
2 14 MartiWnez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561-62.
215 Id. at 545-47.
216 Id. at 556-57.
217 Id. at 557.
2 18 Id.
219 Id. at 557-58.
220 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
221 Id. at 878.
222 Id. at 880.
223 Id. at 882.
224 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
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suspicion that the driver was engaged in criminal activity. 225 Balancing the
intrusion of the driver's privacy against the government's interest in promoting
safety on the state's roads, the Court held that the traffic stop violated the
fourth amendment.226 Because random spot checks are likely to concern or
frighten drivers, while only marginally contributing to highway safety, the
Court determined that the state's interest did not outweigh the privacy
intrusion. 227
However, Prouse is almost as significant for its dicta as for its holding.
Writing for the majority, Justice White noted that the holding of Delavare v.
Prouse "does not preclude the State of Delaware or other states from
developing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do not
involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion. Questioning of all oncoming
traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative." 228
Thus, the Supreme Court has made a clear distinction between
systematized state-run roadblocks and random traffic stops. Because the latter
are subject to broad discretion, the Court has found that the individual's
privacy interest outweighs governmental interests.
Even if a roadblock effectively curbs discretion on the part of individual
officers, prior to Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 229 there was
some question as to how effective a roadblock had to be in advancing the
state's interest. For example, one of the reasons the Court deemed the officer's
conduct in Prouse unconstitutional was the fact that random spot checks were
unlikely to have much impact on highway safety. 230 The recent Sitz case,
however, suggests that states need show only a minimal correlation between the
state's means and goal in order to be considered "reasonable."9 1
In Sitz, the police established a sobriety checkpoint program based on
guidelines from a Sobriety Checkpoint Advisory Committee governing the
operation of the checkpoint, site selection, and publicity. 23 2 On average, each
vehicle stopped as part of the checkpoint was detained for twenty-five
seconds. 233 Of the 126 vehicles that were stopped, two drivers were arrested
for driving under the influence of alcohol.234
225 Id. at 650-51.
226 Id. at 653-55.
227 Id. at 656-59.
228 Id. at 663.
229 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
230 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 660.
231 Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453-55.
232 Id. at 447.
233 Id. at 448.
234 Id.
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In deciding that these checkpoints were constitutional, the Court found that
deterring drunk-driving is an important state interest while the interference with
individual liberty is minimal because most drivers were only delayed for an
average of twenty-five seconds. 235 Finally, the Court determined that the
seizure effectively advanced the government's interest even though only 1.5%
of the drivers who passed through the Michigan checkpoint were arrested for
drunk-driving. 23 6 The Court emphasized that the effectiveness component of
the balancing test "was not meant to transfer from politically accountable
officials to the courts the decision as to which among reasonable alternative law
enforcement techniques should be employed to deal with a serious public
danger." 237 Thus, as long as a state presents some evidence of effectiveness,
the Court has noted a willingness to defer to the state's judgment.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ARISING FROM SATURATION PATROLS AND
ROADBLOCKS
Although the Supreme Court has dealt extensively with constitutional
issues involving street encounters and roadblocks, new questions emerge with
the increasing use of saturation patrols and roadblocks. Two factors may
account for this wave of constitutional questions. First, publicity, the greatest
asset of these programs, is also their greatest weakness because watch-dog
groups can easily monitor these programs for constitutional errors. Second, the
ambiguous standards and fact-specific approaches which the Supreme Court has
used to analyze seizure issues has provided little guidance for police officials
implementing innovative programs. This section examines several
constitutional issues arising from these programs, focusing particularly on the
voluntary contact/seizure distinction, the stop/arrest distinction, and the
balancing test for roadblocks.
A. Voluntary Contact or Seizure?
The Supreme Court's treatment of the distinction between voluntary police-
citizen contacts and seizures is one area presenting constitutional confusion in
conjunction with these programs. Lower courts have been perplexed with
deciding seizure issues using the Mendenhall-Royer "free to leave" test.23 8
235 Id. at 453-55.
236 Id. at 454-55.
237 Id. at 453-54.
238 See supra notes 116-29 and accompanying text.
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Inconsistency seems to result as certain fact scenerios result in seizures in some
lower courts and voluntary contact in other lower courts.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's new "free to decline" test announced in
Florida v. Bostick does not appear to adequately clear up these
inconsistencies. 23 9 Lower courts are still left asking "when is an individual free
to decline, an officer's requests?" Professor William LaFave suggests that a
better approach for assessing voluntary contact/seizure questions is to examine
the police officer's conduct in terms of whether the police officer, even if
making inquiries a private citizen would not, has otherwise behaved in a
manner which would be perceived as an inoffensive contact if it occurred
between two ordinary citizens. 240 Arguably, the Supreme Court implicitly is
already applying such a test; however, because the Court's current explicit
language is ambiguous, as well as the fact that the application of these tests is
quite fact specific, lower courts are left confused.
This confusion can be problematic for attorneys wishing to challenge the
constitutionality of aggressive policing tactics and for police administrators
wishing to create constitutional programs. Clearly, there are certain situations
in which the Supreme Court's tests are easy to apply. For instance, one
newspaper account of a sweep in Operation Clean Sweep indicated that twenty
people had to line up while police officers searched each individual's pockets
and checked each person's identification. 241 Most, if not all courts, would
indicate that this practice constitutes a seizure. After all, even under the stricter
Bostick test, most individuals would not feel free to decline an officer's
requests in this situation.
However, most scenarios fall into a much more gray area. For example,
consider the ACLU's version of an A.C.E. offensive in which citizens are
approached by several officers and asked to state their names, produce
identifications, and explain their presence in the area.242 On the one hand, there
are reasons for characterizing this contact as a seizure. First, by applying the
literal language in the plurality's opinion in Mendenhall, a reasonable person is
likely to feel that he cannot leave when several uniformed officers approach
him at the same time, and there is a substantial, visible police presence in the
rest of the neighborhood. As Professor Tracey Maclin observed, officers using
aggressive patrol tactics are "engaged in serious business. These are not casual
encounters; officers are armed and have a mission." 243 Second, in determining
239 See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
240 LaFave, supra note 132, at 424-25.
241 See Anderson & Walsh, supra note 68.
242 See Glass v. City of Columbus, No. C2-91-775 (S.D. Ohio, filed Sept. 20, 1991).
243 Tracey Maclin, Justice Thurgood Marshall: Taking the Fourth Amendment
Seriously, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 723, 808 (1992).
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whether a police-citizen encounter constitutes a seizure, Justice Stewart cited
tone and language as relevant factors.244 It could be argued that the question
"what are you doing in the neighborhood?" is accusatory and almost
commands a response on the part of a citizen.
On the other hand, there are several reasons for labeling this contact as
voluntary. First, the presence of several officers is not alone enough reason to
infer involuntariness. 245 In United States v. Dunson,246 the Sixth Circuit
determined that the defendant's consent to search his vehicle was voluntary
even though three officers were present in three separate police cars. The Court
of Appeals admitted that this situation might have an unsettling effect on
anyone carrying a large quantity of drugs, but emphasized that the reasonable
person test contemplates a reasonable person innocent of any crime.247
Second, these encounters occur in a public place-the street. Lower courts,
as well as the Supreme Court, have indicated that individuals are less likely to
be subjected to undue police influence in public areas where persons other than
law enforcement officers can view the police practices. 248
Third, the officers in these encounters are merely asking for some
identification, a practice which the Supreme Court has said does not, by itself,
make an encounter a stop. 249 Moreover, while an officer's language or tone
requesting this information might be construed as accusatory, these are only
two of the factors to be considered when deciding whether an encounter
constitutes a seizure. Display of a weapon or some physical touching of the
citizen, factors which more clearly communicate to an individual that he is not
free to leave, often do not occur in these situations. One could argue that a
more definite showing of force or authority, other than a strong tone of voice
or harsh language, is needed to establish compulsion.
Finally, the Supreme Court, as well as lower courts, increasingly seems to
place an affirmative duty on the individual to first decline the officer's
requests. 250 At the very least, courts seem more sympathetic to a defendant's
objection that he was unduly influenced by an officer when the individual first
244 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
245 See, e.g., INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
246 940 F.2d 989, 994 (6th Cir. 1991).
247 Id.
248 See Williamson, supra note 77, at 794.
2 49 Delgado, 466 U.S. 210.
250 See Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991); United States v. Wilson, 953 F.2d
116 (4th Cir. 1991); Peterson v. City of Plymouth, 945 F.2d 1416 (8th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Locklin, 943 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1991).
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attempted to terminate the contact. 251 When the officer continues to question
the individual or follow him after the individual has attempted to disengage
contact, courts find that a seizure has occurred. 252
Unfortunately, most fact patterns do not involve a situation in which the
individual informs the police officer that he does not want to answer questions.
Thus, courts are left to determine whether the individual felt free to decline by
balancing the above arguments. Moreover, one fact may change an entire
analysis. For instance, although a court might decide that no seizure occurs
from a mere request for identification, the court may find a seizure when an
individual's identification is taken for over twenty minutes in order to conduct
a warrant check. Thus, courts are left with a case-by-case analysis which leaves
attorneys as well as police administrators frustrated.
B. Arrest or Stop?
The blurry distinction between arrests and stops presents another
constitutional problem for these programs. This distinction becomes
particularly important with saturation patrols because officers will be afforded
more powers if a particular encounter is deemed an arrest. On the other hand,
this label also may be to an officer's detriment since an officer may have a
sufficient level of suspicion to effect a stop but not an arrest. Two areas
specifically emphasize the problems with an ambiguous arrest/stop distinction:
detaining individuals for minor violations and checking for outstanding
warrants.
1. Minor Violations
Strict enforcement of minor traffic and criminal offenses is the heart of the
saturation patrol. By stringently enforcing these laws, officers hope to deter
individuals who are interested in buying/selling drugs or engaging in gang
activity from the area. 253 However, the use of minor violations as a predicate
for stopping individuals to check to see if they are carrying drugs or have any
outstanding warrants may pose problems depending on whether the seizure is
defined as a stop or an arrest.
251 See Peterson v. City of Plymouth, 945 F.2d 1416 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Wilson, 953 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1991).
252 Peterson v. City of Plymouth, 945 F.2d 1416 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Wilson, 953 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1991).
253 See Columbus City Police Dep't, supra note 6.
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Typically, the scenario arises as follows: officers detain an individual,
conduct a full search, run a warrant check, and then cite the individual at the
end of the contact for a minor offense such as jaywalking.254 Three questions
need to be asked regarding these contacts. First, should a detention for a citable
minor violation be considered an arrest, and if so, should a search incident to
the arrest be allowed? Second, if it can be considered an arrest, at what point
has such a detention become an arrest? Third, if the contact is considered an
arrest from the initial detention, is it pretextual?
Regarding the first question, some commentators suggest that investigatory
detentions should be limited to serious offenses. 255 Two rationales are given
for this suggestion. First, if an offense is minor, then the social interest in
detecting and deterring the activity is also minor.25 6 Thus, searching an
individual and detaining him for an extended amount of time may be excessive
and unreasonable. 257 Second, minor offenses are of such a nature that officers
might abuse their discretion if they are allowed to further investigate an
individual based on such an offense.25 8
In addition, many jurisdictions have statutes limiting officers to issuing
citations for minor violations rather than permitting arrest and transport to the
station house.25 9 In these jurisdictions, it seems unreasonable to allow officers
to frisk the suspect because the purposes of the search incident to arrest are not
furthered. If the officer issues a citation, the officer's safety concerns are less
pronounced than if the officer places the individual in the back of the squad car
and takes the individual to the station house. Moreover, the officer need not be
concerned about the destruction of evidence because minor violations usually
do not involve physical evidence. Acknowledging these problems, lower courts
in jurisdictions containing such statutes generally have suppressed evidence
obtained incident to an arrest for a minor violation.260
254 See generally Glass v. City of Columbus, No. C2-91-775 (S.D. Ohio, filed Sept.
20, 1991).
255 George E. Dix, Nonarrest Investigatory Detentions in Search and Seizure Law,
1985 DuKE L.J. 849, 871-72; LaFave, supra note 132, at 441-42.
256 Dix, supra note 255, at 871.
257 Id.
258 Id.; LaFave, supra note 132, at 441.
259 See, e.g., Orno REv. CODE ANN. § 2935.36(A) (Anderson 1991)
("Notwithstanding any other provision of the Revised Code, when a law enforcement
officer is otherwise authorized to arrest a person for the commission of a minor
misdemeanor, the officer shall not arrest the person, but shall issue a citation ...
260 LaFave, supra note 132, at 442.
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Some lower courts have allowed frisks of suspects incident to a temporary
detention while a citation is being prepared. 261 However, in these situations,
there is usually some reason to believe that the individual might be armed and
dangerous. For instance, the individual makes a sudden move to a place where
a weapon might be located, fails to respond to the officer's request to remove
his hands from pockets, or the individual has a suspicious bulge in his clothing
resembling a weapon.262
Assuming that detentions for minor violations can be considered arrests
and that searches incident to these temporary arrests are permissible, then the
next question is at what point has such a detention become an arrest? If the
individual is arrested from the moment the individual is detained, then
presumably the above scenerio is constitutional because the officers are merely
conducting a search incident to arrest. However, if the individual is only
"stopped" until the officers can gain further evidence to determine whether a
citation should be issued, then the search may be considered unreasonable
under the fourth amendment.
An argument for treating this practice as a stop is that because the officer
has not told the suspect that he is being cited for a minor violation, appearances
indicate that the officer is merely accumulating more information to determine
whether a violation has in fact occurred (for example, the officer may want to
make sure that the proper car was stopped or that the tail light is inoperable).
In addition, this situation is unlike Gustafson v. Florida63 and United
States v. Robinson,264 cases which held that officers may conduct a search
incident to arrest even for violations such as driving without a license. In both
Gustafson and Robinson, the suspects were told that they were "under arrest"
before a search of their car or person was made. 265 Because suspects stopped
under these programs often are not told why they are being detained until the
end of the encounter, this situation seems more like Terry than Gustafson and
Robinson. To the suspect, the officer appears to be gathering information
without any specific purpose.
Finally, by allowing officers to use minor violations as a way to detain and
search individuals for drugs or firearms, courts may be endorsing a dangerous
trend. Because many minor violations are difficult to disprove, officers may be
encouraged to create illusory minor violations in order to stop individuals so
that they can be searched.
261 3 LAFAVE, supra note 166, § 9.4(a), at 509.
262 Id.
263 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
264 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
265 Gustafson, 414 U.S. at 262; Robinson, 414 U.S. at 220.
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However, there is an argument that this type of contact is an arrest. After
all, as discussed above, an individual does not have to be told that he is "under
arrest" for an arrest to be effectuated. 266 Instead, the circumstances can denote
an arrest.
Also, officers often do not need to verify any facts in order to issue a
citation for a minor violation. For example, if an officer has directly viewed a
suspect jaywalk, the officer already has sufficient probable cause to cite the
individual. Once an officer has made this determination (arrest), then the
officer may permissibly search the individual incident to the arrest.
Finally, police officers always have the opportunity to fabricate offenses in
order to detain individuals. This practice can occur with or without minor
violations. In fact, if an officer wants to stop an individual for possessing
drugs, the officer simply can lie and say that a baggie which appeared to
contain drugs was hanging from the suspect's pocket.
Assuming that the officer has made an arrest from the initial contact, the
final question to ask is whether this arrest was pretextual. This question is
problematic in the context of minor violations for two reasons. First, as
Professor LaFave indicates, minor offenses are so pervasive that officers
usually can stop an individual for some minor offense as a pretext in order to
investigate another offense for which officers do not have reasonable
suspicion.267 Second, even in those jurisdictions that do not have statutes
mandating that officers cite individuals for minor offenses, many police
departments have implicit policies that officers only should issue citations for
minor offenses rather than arrest individuals and take them into custody.268
Two approaches have been suggested for dealing with officers arresting
individuals for minor violations in order to investigate other possible criminal
activity. Professor LaFave suggests that courts should examine deviations from
usual police practices. 269 Thus, if the usual practice in a police department is to
issue citations for minor offenses, and an officer unreasonably arrests an
individual for a minor offense, then the arrest will be considered pretextual and
the subsequent search incident to arrest will be deemed impermissible. Several
lower courts have accepted LaFave's approach. 270 The other approach used by
266 See supra subpart II.A.3. and accompanying notes.
267 Burkoff, supra note 197, at 532 (citing 1 LAFAVE, supra note 166, § 1.2, at 32).
268 See, e.g., Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262, 265 (9th Cir. 1961).
269 Burkoft, supra note 197, at 527-28 (citing 1 LAFAvE, supra note 166, § 1.2, at
33).
270 See United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Bates, 840 F.2d 858, 860 (11th Cir. 1988) (proper inquiry is whether a reasonable officer
would have made the arrest absent improper motivation); United States v. Causey, 818 F.2d
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some lower courts looks at whether: 1) the officer has probable cause that the
individual committed the minor traffic violation; and 2) the arresting officer
was authorized by the state to effect a custodial arrest for the particular
offense.271 Under this approach, the usual police practices in the area are not
considered.
Because this issue has not been decided by the Supreme Court, police
administrators and attorneys have to be aware of the position of courts in their
jurisdiction when making policy decisions about police programs. At this point,
courts seem to be favoring the second approach.272
2. Warrant Checks
The stop/arrest distinction also presents problems in the warrant check
context. If an individual is under arrest when the officer conducts a warrant
check, then the officer is given more latitude as to the length of time expended
during the detention. However, if an individual is being "stopped," then he
may only be detained for a reasonable amount of time.
According to the ACLU in Columbus, individuals who were stopped as
part of Operation A.C.E. had to wait for thirty minutes while the police
conducted warrant checks. 273 If an individual is only "stopped" while the
warrant check is being conducted, there may be reason to be concerned about
the length of this detention.
However, these warrant checks are only ten minutes longer than the twenty
minute stop which the Supreme Court found reasonable in United States v.
Sharpe.274 Moreover, the Court has refused to set a time limit for stops;
instead, the Court has focused on whether the officers were pursuing a
legitimate investigative technique for confirming or dispelling their
suspicions.275 On the other hand, the Court's comments in United States v.
Place276 that it has never approved a ninety minute stop suggest that lengthier
detentions will be scrutinized carefully.
354 (5th Cir. 1987), rev'd en banc, 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987); Taglavore v. United
States, 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1991).
271 See United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Basey, 816 F.2d 980 (5th Cir.
1987).
272 As the court in Cummins points out, only the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits continue
to hold to the more lenient standard. Cwmins, 920 F.2d at 501.
273 Glass v. City of Columbus, No. C2-91-775, 10-15 (S.D. Ohio, filed Sept. 20,
1991).
274 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
275 Id. at 685.
276 462 U.S. 696 (1982).
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Thus, the question becomes-is conducting a warrant check a legitimate
investigative technique for confirming or dispelling suspicions? The answer to
this question may depend on: 1) the type of offense for which the individual is
being detained; and 2) the reason for conducting the warrant check.
To some extent, lower courts have looked at the severity of the crime for
which the individual is being detained in deciding the reasonableness of
conducting a warrant check.277 For instance, the Ninth Circuit held that
detaining an individual stopped for jaywalking in order to run a warrant check
violates the fourth amendment if there is no reason to suspect that the
individual has outstanding warrants. 278 Examining the severity of the suspected
offense makes some sense because the Court noted in Teny v. Ohio that
seizures must be reasonable given the circumstances. 279 When an individual
detained is suspected of serious criminal activity, as in United States v.
Sharpe,280 then a warrant check may confirm the officer's suspicion that the
individual is dangerous. A thirty minute warrant check for a suspected
jaywalker seems to push the concept of reasonableness to the extreme.
However, some lower courts have found that conducting a warrant check is
permissible even if the individual is only stopped for a minor violation when
the individual gives the officer some reason to believe that the individual may
have outstanding warrants. 281 For instance, if the individual takes evasive
action during the course of the stop, then the officer may have reason to
suspect that the individual has outstanding warrants.
Contrary to the above stated position of some lower courts, other lower
courts regularly allow police officers to run warrant checks with little concern
about the time required to conduct these checks. 282 After all, this police
practice is considered routine in many jurisdictions. Moreover, if police
277 See United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1973) (warrant check of
jaywalker impermissible); cf. People v. McGaughran, 585 P.2d 206 (Cal. 1978) (warrant
check on individual stopped for traffic violation proper only if individual gives officer
reason to suspect that the individual may have outstanding warrants), rev'd on reh'g, 601
P.2d 207 (Cal. 1979) (changed rule so that officer could conduct warrant check if the check
could be conducted within the same time period to examine driver's license and
registration); People v. Ellis, 446 N.E.2d 1282 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (warrant check of
burglary suspect permissible); State v. McFarland, 446 N.E.2d 1168 (Ohio 1982)
(permissible to do warrant check of individual suspected of drug sales); State v. Swaite, 656
P.2d 520 (Wash. 1982) (record check of burglary suspect permissible).278 Luckett, 484 F.2d at 90-91.
279 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968).
280 470 U.S. 675 (1985) (individual suspected of narcotics trafficking).
281 See Luckett, 484 F.2d at 91.
282 See, e.g., State v. Hewey, 471 A.2d 236 (Vt. 1983).
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officers are unable to conduct warrant checks for minor traffic violations, then
many individuals with outstanding warrants will escape detection altogether.
C. General Deterrence Roadblocks
Although roadblocks share some of the same constitutional problems as
other street encounters, the most significant unresolved constitutional dilemma
concerning roadblocks is the effectiveness prong of the balancing test. Under
the balancing test, the seriousness of the public interest served by the roadblock
and the degree to which the roadblock advances the public interest will be
weighed against the severity of the roadblock's interference with individual
liberty.283 The problem for lower courts is determining how effective a
roadblock has to be to advance the public interest. The depth of this problem is
illustrated in two cases from Washington, D.C.
In April, 1991, Operation Clean Sweep met with a crushing blow when
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals found that the roadblocks
implemented as part of the program were unconstitutional.284 In Galberth v.
United States, the court determined that the department's general deterrence
rationale for the roadblock, that it would deter drug traffic and violence
associated with drugs, did not outweigh the liberty interests of individuals.285
Unlike the fixed border patrols and sobriety checkpoints which the Supreme
Court has found constitutional, the roadblocks in these circumstances were not
effective enough for their stated purposes.286
At the other extreme is United States v. McFayden.287 In McFayden, the
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found that roadblocks
employed in the sixth district of the city (as part of Operation Clean Sweep)
were constitutional because the roadblocks served the legitimate government
interest of "respond[ing] to identified problems of traffic congestion . . .
improv[ing] traffic enforcement in neighborhoods experiencing serious
problems... [and] allow[ing] police to check for a driver's license and vehicle
registration. ... "288 The court came to this conclusion based on testimony that
pedestrian drug dealers disrupt traffic by stepping into traffic to display the
drugs, and buyers also disrupt traffic patterns by "stopping illegally, making
U-turns or double parking in order to make drug purchases." 289
283 Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
284 Galberth v. United States, 590 A.2d 990 (D.C. App. 1991).
285 Id. at 997-99.
286 Id.
287 865 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
288 Id. at 1307.
289 Id. at 1308.
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Essentially, both cases concern the same roadblocks. However, there are
two significant differences in these cases. First, in McFayden, the department
described the purpose of the roadblock in terms of traffic-related matters. 290 In
contrast, the purpose of the roadblocks in Galberth was described as deterring
drug trafficking and violence. 291 The relatedness of these items to driving or
traffic matters is not readily apparent. Second, in McFayden, testimony was
presented on how the roadblock would effect the government interest.292 In
contrast, there was no empirical evidence presented in the Galberth case
explaining how the roadblocks would advance the state's interest.293
The lesson from these cases for police departments may be that police
officials should carefully articulate purposes for roadblocks which can be linked
to driving or traffic matters. However, police officials should be careful not to
articulate goals which are merely a pretext for another purpose. For instance,
police officials may run into legal troubles if they announce that the purpose of
a roadblock is to check drivers' licenses and registrations when the actual
purpose is to deter drug trafficking. Instead, police officials should try to link
their actual purpose to a traffic-related matter as was done in McFayden with
testimony that drug sellers and buyers were disrupting traffic patterns.
The checkpoints in Paramount may suffer from some of the same
drawbacks as the roadblocks in Operation Clean Sweep because checkpoints
may not be an effective way to deter gang violence. Although drunk drivers
must use vehicles to commit an offense and illegal aliens must use some
transportation to cross the border, gang members need not use a motor vehicle
to effectuate their crimes. Thus, courts may find that these checkpoints intrude
on the rights of innocent citizens without furthering the public interest of
deterring gang violence. The goal, then, for Paramount may be to find a
purpose which is related to traffic concerns. For instance, Paramount might
want to articulate a policy in which the purpose of the checkpoints is to deter
drive-by shootings associated with gang activities.
V. THE FUTURE FOR POLICE INNOVATION
A. Short Tenn and Long Term Impact
In spite of some potential constitutional problems, there are several positive
aspects to these programs. First, at least in the short run, these programs are
290 Id. at 1307.
291 Galberth v. United States, 590 A.2d 990, 998-99 (D.C. App. 1991).
292 United States v. McFayden, 865 F.2d 1306, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
293 Galberth, 590 A.2d at 999.
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very popular. Community support initially is quite strong.294 In fact, in
Columbus, residents from one neighborhood actually petitioned the police
department to bring Operation A.C.E. into their neighborhood. 295 Second, in
the initial phases of these programs, police morale is boosted. 296 Not only do
officers find saturation patrols to be exciting, action-oriented police work, but
they also feel like they are actually doing something about crime.297
As the programs continue, however, some negative results begin to
develop. Residents become dissatisfied with the programs as they fail to live up
to their lofty goals.298 Often, these programs are unable to achieve their
proposed deterrent function. Drug dealers and gang members merely continue
their activities at times when the saturation patrols or roadblocks are not in
operation, change their business tactics, or move their activities to new
neighborhoods. 299 For example, in Washington D.C., drug dealers began
dealing out of cars instead of openly selling drugs on street corners. 300 And in
Los Angeles, one gang shooting occurred only hours after an Operation
Hammer offensive.30 1 Faced with such reports, residents, as well as police
officers, feel disillusioned.
Even if community support continues to exist for these programs, they
often must be abandoned due to budgetary concerns. 30 2 Because these
programs require a substantial number of officers for a patrol unit, the city
must either shift manpower and resources from other departments, hire new
294 See Catherine Candisky and Mary Stephens, ACLU to Probe Crime Program,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 25, 1991; Rae-Dupree, supra note 49; Mary Stephens,
Operation ACE Nets Hundreds of Arrests, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 12, 1991, at B1.
295 Pereira, supra note 26.
296 Lovell Beaulleu & Bruce Cadwallader, Residents See Good, Bad in Short North
Roadblocks, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 30, 1991, at C1.
297 Id.; John Ward Anderson, 'Clean Sweep' Takes Drug Effort to the Streets, WASH.
POST, Sept. 27, 1986, atB1.
298 See, e.g., Wheeler & Horewitz, supra note 60.
299 See, e.g., John H. Lee, Sweeps Target Gangs, Drunks and 'Johns,' L.A. TIMES,
July 10, 1989, Part 2, at 6; Rick Holguin, Officials Ready New Approach on Gangs:
Checkpoints, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1991 (Long Beach Section) Part J, at 1; Pierre Thomas,
Antidrug Sweep Judged a Sucess; Arrests Cear Streets in Georgetown South, WASH. POST,
Mar. 23, 1989 (Virginia Weekly Section) at vi; Wheeler & Horwitz, supra note 60.
300 Thomas, supra note 299.
301 Lee, supra note 299.
302 Wheeler & Horwitz, supra note 60; Daniel Klaidman, District's 'Year of
Inconpetence, 'LEGALTIMES, Dec. 19, 1988, at 18.
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officers, or pay current officers for overtime work.303 The first option may
sacrifice other law enforcement areas. With the latter two situations, the city
must acquire more funding to pay for these programs. Moreover, having
officers work overtime may actually decrease police morale as officers bum out
from working too many hours.304
Congested courts and overcrowded jails also stand as a barricade to the
continuation of these programs. Faced with their own budgetary constraints,
the court and penal systems are having trouble dealing with the increasing
number of arrests generated from these programs. 30 5 Thus, the individual
arrested today may be back on the streets in months, weeks, or even days.
B. Alternative Approaches to Aggressive Policing
Because programs like Operation A.C.E., Operation Hammer, Operation
Clean Sweep, and the Paramount checkpoints often are plagued with practical
problems as well as constitutional problems, a better approach for long-term
police innovation may be community-oriented or problem-oriented policing.
Community-oriented policing focuses on crime prevention rather than crime
reaction by involving officers with local community groups.306 Officers teach
area residents crime prevention tactics such as neighborhood watches, conduct
home security inspections, and provide residents with information about local
crime.307 Community-oriented policing seeks to change the focus of the police
role in society. Instead of looking at their jobs in "we-they" terms, officers are
encouraged to look at their jobs in cooperation with the community.308
Problem-oriented policing focuses on addressing the underlying causes of
criminal behavior. 309 Rather than merely responding to reports that crimes
have occurred, problem-oriented policing looks for "practical ways to prevent
crimes from occurring in the future." 310
Both community-oriented and problem-oriented policing rely on
community involvement. Moreover, these types of policing are often combined
303 See, e.g., Banks, supra note 43; Sari Horwitz, 'The Ghosts Are Always Around a
Little Bit,' WAsH. PosT, June 30, 1991, (Magazine), at WIl; Doug Mcnnis, Police Plan
Shwrt North Roadblocks, COLUMBUS DiSPATCH, May 29, 1991, at B1.304 Horwitz, supra note 303.
305 Id.
306 SKOLNICK & BAYLEY, supra note 4, at 210-11.
3 07 Id. at 29.
308 Id. at 211.
309 Michael Tonry, Public Prosecution and Hydro-Engineering, 75 MINN. L. REV.
971,972 (1991).
310 Id at 972-73.
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in order to react to local crime trends.311 For example, in Santa Ana, a city
which has experimented with community-oriented policing, when residents
near a local park complained of homosexual activity in the park restrooms, an
officer was assigned to patrol the area. 312
Community-oriented and problem-oriented policing may be more suitable
long term answers to rising crime rates because these forms of policing do not
suffer the same drawbacks as the aggressive policing tactics. First, because
these forms of policing focus on positive police-citizen interaction,
constitutional problems are less likely to emerge. Second, these forms of
policing focus on solving problems rather than making arrests, so they are less
likely to exacerbate the problems of courts and jails.
As with aggressive policing tactics, community-oriented and
problem-oriented policing are subject to budgetary constraints. However,
because these forms of policing change the focus of the "policing goal," a
diversion of manpower and resources to community based programs is less
likely to cause substantial harm in other areas. In essence, if the community
feels like the police department is "doing something" about crime through
crime prevention programs, then the community is less likely to demand more
expensive specialized units like SWAT teams. Furthermore, if area residents
are taught how to help themselves prevent crime, they will need fewer officers
on routine patrol.
The greatest challenge for community-oriented and problem-oriented
policing is to maintain community involvement. If officers begin to engage in
less interaction with area residents, then citizens will feel just as disillusioned
as they do when the aggressive programs leave.
C. A Constitutional Blueprint
Although community-oriented or problem-oriented policing may be the
wave of the future, it would be unrealistic to believe that all police departments
can immediately implement programs based on community involvement. Some
cities are so plagued with crime that an aggressive approach is needed. Other
cities lack a sense of community; thus, officers may have some difficulty
finding community groups with which to interact. In these situations,
aggressive policing tactics may actually give the neighborhood a sense of
community-something to rally behind. Perhaps the best approach in cities
such as these is to employ aggressive patrol techniques for a limited time, then
switch to a community-oriented or problem-oriented type of policing. This
311 SKOLNICK & BAYLEY, supra note 4, at 31.
312 Id.
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subsection serves as a constitutional blueprint for cities which are faced with
such a situation.
The first item which police officials should emphasize to uniformed
officers when implementing saturation patrols or roadblocks is that the purpose
of these programs is to rid the area of criminals, not to harass area citizens.
This goal should be reinforced constantly, so that it becomes a part of each
officer's mindset. Arrests are not what counts-making the neighborhood safe
for law-abiding citizens is what matters.
Second, officials should make clear to officers that if they stop an
individual without any articulable suspicion that the individual is committing a
crime, then no more than two officers should confront the individual, any
requests they make should be made in a non-accusatory, polite tone, and at no
time should they display or touch their weapons. And most importantly, if an
individual indicates to the officers that he does not wish to be questioned, they
should discontinue the contact.
Third, if an officer sees an individual engage in a minor violation such as
jaywalking and wants to stop the individual, the officer should immediately
inform the individual that he is being detained because he jaywalked.
Moreover, to avoid constitutional problems, the officer should request consent
before conducting a search or a check for outstanding warrants.
Fourth, in the context of roadblocks, the department should have a clearly
articulated policy which shows that the use of the roadblock is directly related
to furthering some crime control activity.
Finally, creating a police manual specifically addressing these issues as
well as significant Supreme Court decisions is a good idea. Columbus' use of a
test is also recommended. 313
VI. CONCLUSION
Any time that a police department attempts to innovate, police officials are
likely to meet with conflict. This reaction is especially true when a police
department implements an aggressive policing program. However, at least in
theory, programs such as Operation A.C.E., Operation Hammer, Operation
Clean Sweep, and the Paramount checkpoints can be tailored to meet
constitutional standards. The burden falls upon police officials to draft
department guidelines which give officers specific information on what to do in
their daily encounters. Some suggestions for maintaining constitutionally
permissible programs include: 1) emphasizing to officers that the purpose of the
program is to deter crime in the area without harassing law-abiding citizens; 2)
313 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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stressing that no more than two officers should approach an individual for
questioning if the officers do not have articulable suspicion that a crime is
being or has been committed; 3) pointing out to officers that they should
inform individuals immediately that they will be cited for a minor violation if
that is the reason for which the officer initially stopped the person; and 4)
creating a clear purpose for roadblocks which is linked to a traffic-related
matter. Finally, any department which wants to begin an aggressive policing
program should design a manual for affected police officers and create
mandatory testing based on the information in the manual.
By implementing such suggestions, police departments will minimize
constitutional problems; however, aggressive police programs still must walk a
constitutional tightrope since there is great potential for abuse. Moreover, long-
term use of aggressive police programs may cause such undesirable results as
budgetary problems, over crowded prisons, and over burdened court dockets.
Thus, eventually, for the long term, police departments should move toward
community-oriented or problem-oriented policing. Under these approaches, the
focus is on police-community cooperation. Over the long run, this type of
police-citizen contact may be more effective for fighting crime. After all, "feed
a man a fish, you feed him for a day; teach a man to fish, you feed him for a
lifetime." Perhaps the same can be said for street crime. Teach a community
how to solve the causes of crime in their area, and they may resolve crime
problems in their neighborhood in the long run.
Adrienne L. Meiring
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